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Slouching Toward Eden:
The Eco-pragmatic Challenges of
Ecosystem Revival
A. Dan Tarlock

t

INTRODUCTION
Ecosystem revival represents a radical departure from past
environmental paradigms. This new paradigm is riddled with
unarticulated and inconsistent assumptions. The structure of
environmental law and the culture of the agencies that
implement it are based on either the preservation of an
undisturbed nature devoid of humans or pollution control
rather than ecosystem management. We look for quick,
technological fixes to mitigate the worst adverse environmental
impacts of activities rather than the sustained management of
functioning ecosystems. This Article explores some of the
underlying scientific and legal problems that are raised by the
many ecosystem revival efforts underway throughout the world
in an effort to articulate and minimize such difficulties.
I. FROM NATURE PRESERVATION TO ECOSYSTEM
REVIVAL
A.

OUR CHANGED VIEW OF NATURE

The revival of degraded ecosystems is a major focus of

t Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965,
Stanford University. This Article is part of an ongoing effort to explore the
possible applications to environmental laws of recent advances in the science
of ecology, especially those applications which relate to the conservation of
aquatic biodiversity. This Article incorporates and expands on portions of my
previously published treatments of the issues raised by the new ecology and
related scientific issues. I would like to thank Professor Jim Chen for
organizing the excellent Symposium, The PragmaticEcologist:Environmental
Protection as a JurisdynamicExperience, and for the opportunity to learn from
the stimulating presentations and papers of the other participants.

1173

1174

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1173

second generation environmental law and policy.1 This reflects
the fact that environmentalism is a young but rapidly evolving
movement that is both the product of advances in scientific
understanding of the consequences of human modification of
natural systems and potentially profound changes in societal
values. 2 Environmentalism has derived much of its legitimacy
from an imperfect understanding of ecology. 3 At the dawn of
the modern environmental movement in the late 1960s, ecology
seemed to reinforce the increasingly widespread belief that
society should preserve as much "nature" as possible from
human degradation. 4 Environmental policy, however, is much
more complicated than we initially assumed.
Nature
preservation is an example of the maddening complexity of
second generation
environmental policy. The simple idea that
"untrammeled" 5 nature is both morally and scientifically
superior to the modified landscape has now morphed into the
ambitious but extremely ambiguous argument that we should
conserve biodiversity-the complex, continuing process of
species and ecosystem evolution-to the maximum extent
6
possible.
The teaching of biodiversity conservation and the applied
science that it has spawned, conservation biology, have
fundamentally changed our view of nature preservation.
Consistent with postmodern philosophy, which views all ideas
as social constructs, we understand that "[t]he very concept
[of] ... environmental problems ... refers to a normative state
of nature."7 Most scientists have rejected, as impractical and

1. Gilbert F. White, Reflections on ChangingPerceptionsof the Earth, 19
ANN. REV. ENERGY& ENV'T 1, 8 (1994).
2. See id. at 2 (articulating the stages of this value shift).
3. A second major source of legitimacy in environmental law is the
hypothesis, popular in occupational medicine, that exposure to toxic
substances creates a serious risk of cancer. See ROBERT N. PROCTOR, CANCER
WARS: HOW POLITICS SHAPES WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW ABOUT

CANCER 1 (1995) (reviewing oncological theories ranging from environmental
exposure to genetic predisposition and describing their influence on the
legitimacy of environmental regulation).
4. See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS & THE AMERICAN MIND

368 (4th ed. 2001).
5. This term is taken from the definition of "wilderness" in the
Wilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2000).
6. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 312 (1992).
7. See Elizabeth Ann R. Bird, The Social Construction of Nature:
Theoretical Approaches to the History of Environmental Problems, ENVTL.
REV., Winter 1987, at 255, 260.
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unsound, the romantic idea that nature is, and should forever
be, a place without humans. In much of the world, there are
few places where undisturbed nature exists. Moreover, much
of what we thought was undisturbed nature had in fact been
substantially modified by aboriginal peoples prior to European
contact.8 Modern ecology counsels that the future focus of
environmental protection should be on the revival and adaptive
management of previously degraded ecosystems. It also tells
us that we must take landscapes as we find them, including
human interlopers. 9
As a result, modern ecology and
environmental management are returning to the problem posed
by Genesis: How should one manage the Garden of Eden after
it has been populated and degraded by humans?10
B.

REVIVAL VERSUS RESTORATION

The problems of returning to the Garden of the Eden are
manifold, starting with terminology. Ecosystem restoration is
the more common term," but its accepted meaning is too
narrow to describe the thousands of large and small ecosystem
improvement efforts and to describe other improvement
options. 12 A major 1992 report by a National Academy of
8. The question of the extent to which Native Americans modified the
landscape is the subject of lively recent historical debate. See TIM FLANNERY,
THE ETERNAL FRONTIER: AN ECO-HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA AND ITS
PEOPLES 194 (2001); SHEPARD H. KETCH, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN: MYTH AND
HISTORY 22 (1999); see also TED STEINBERG, DOWN TO EARTH: NATURE'S ROLE
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 11 (2002).
9. Consistent with this understanding, modern ecology views humans
not as alien, exotic species to be eliminated to the maximum extent possible,
but as important ecosystem actors. Many environmentalists, however, find
this idea disturbing because it will promote ecosystem degradation. See, e.g.,
Oliver A. Houck, Are Humans Part of Ecosystems?, 28 ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (1998)
(stating that humans are part of ecosystems but are not their measure).
10. Most environmental philosophy views the assertion of human primacy
over nature as the original sin and tries to rectify this by radically shrinking
the human role. See, e.g., J. BAIRD CALLICOTT, EARTH'S INSIGHTS 14-43
(1994); cf. Judith M. Green, Retrieving the Human Place in Nature, 17 ENVTL.
ETHICS 381, 389-93 (1995) (recounting the influence of Western beliefs on
ecology).
For a lucid discussion of the response of Judeo-ChristianEnlightenment thought to the problems posed by the Genesis narratives of a
complete, earthly paradise and the reality of human exploitation of the earth,
see JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 7-27 (1974).
11. The leading journal is RestorationEcology.
12. Professor Alyson C. Flournoy has proposed a broader, medically
derived definition to address the limitations of the term. Alyson C. Flournoy,
Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription,42 ARiZ. L. REV. 187 (2000).
She would define restoration as a return to a healthy and vigorous state. Id.
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Sciences Committee 13 defined restoration as "the return of an
ecosystem to a close approximation of its condition prior to
disturbance." 14 This definition distinguishes restoration from
other improvements such as creation, reclamation, and
rehabilitation because only restoration is a holistic process
rather than "the isolated manipulation of individual
elements." 15 The report also distinguished restoration from
mitigation, which it dismissed as "simply the alleviating of any
or all detrimental effects arising from a given action" as well as
from preservation. 16 This Article uses the term ecosystem
revival instead of restoration because it encompasses all efforts
to improve degraded ecosystems that may fall short of
returning to the "original." The term "revival" avoids difficult,
at 188. For a brief but insightful analysis of the problems of following the
strict definition of restoration, see Max Oelschlaeger, The Politics of
Wilderness Preservation and Ecological Restoration, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J.
235, 237-39 (2002).
13.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS

(1992). Technically, the National Academy of Sciences, a group of elected
members, operates through the National Research Council (NRC). Id. at viii.
The NRC organizes government and other funded research on a wide range of
policy issues with a major scientific or technical component. Id.
14. Id. at 18. In 1994, the Ecological Society of America adopted a
resolution that defines restoration as "the process of repairing damage caused
by humans to the diversity and dynamics of indigenous ecosystems." Laura L.
Jackson et al., Ecological Restoration: A Definition and Comments, 3
RESTORATION ECOLOGY 71, 71 (1995).

15. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 17. The effort to reverse
the damming of Hetch Hetchy Valley is an example of the correct but
problematic use of the term restoration. See RICHARD WHITE, IT'S YOUR
MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN 412-15 (1991). The cause c6l bre of the
preservation movement in the early twentieth century was the construction of
O'Shaughnessy Dam and Hetch Hetchy Reservoir north of Yosemite National
Park to supply San Francisco with water. Id. The city is now planning to
spend over four billion dollars to make the water delivery system more
earthquake resistant. Chuck Carroll, Back to the Past: Environmentalists
Want Study on Tearing Down Dam at Hetch Hetchy to Restore Nature, SAN
JOSE MERCURY,
Aug. 11, 2002, Posting from Jeffrey Cohen,
WATER45@email.msn.com, to http://listhostl.water.ca.gov/mailman/listinfo/
water news (Aug. 11, 2002) (on file with Minnesota Law Review). Several
NGOs have announced that they will oppose the plan unless the city studies
the feasibility of removing the dam, restoring the valley to its "original" state,
and storing the water in a reservoir closer to San Francisco. Dean E. Murphy,
Conservationists Try to Undo Large Reservoir in Yosemite, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2002, at Al. The "restoration" of ecosystems through dam removal is not
simple. See THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE ENV'T, DAM
REMOVAL: SCIENCE AND DECISION MAKING 47-49 (2002).
16. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 18-19.

Preservation
assumes that the functions to be conserved are intact and thus do not need to
be re-created through restoration. Id.
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almost theological, definitional issues that these efforts raise.
C. ECOSYSTEM REVIVAL AND ITS PROBLEMS

The reasons for the shift from nature preservation to
ecosystem revival are numerous.
At least in developed
countries such as the United States, however, the three most
important are necessity, the rise of biodiversity as an
organizing concept, 17 and the capture of much environmental
discourse by science and welfare economics. Ecosystem revival
is necessary simply because there is little "pure" nature to
preserve. We have degraded so much, especially in the last two
centuries, 18 and much of what we have preserved does not
substantially advance the objective of biodiversity conservation.
Biodiversity conservation has changed our view of "natural"
systems

because nature has played a nice trick on us:

biodiversity hot spots, rich with species, are generally found in
warm areas where there is a very high level of human
activity. 19 Many of the vast nature preserves that we have
created, such as the National Wilderness system, are in remote,
cold areas and therefore not, in fact, rich in biodiversity.2 0
Thus, to conserve biodiversity, we must both protect remaining
unmodified systems and revive others to create an eco21
functional landscape.
Ecosystem revival reflects the triumph of a strictly
anthropocentric view of nature over the earnest, but largely
unsuccessful, efforts to construct an operational nonanthropocentric view. 22 The environmentalist successors to the
preservation movement saw a landscape of awe-inspiring
17.

See DAVID TACKAS, THE IDEA OF BIODIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES IN

PARADISE (1996) (recounting the history of the construction of the term
"biodiversity").
18.

See J. R. MCNEILL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN, at xxv (2000)

(describing how ecosystem degradation is increasing in scale and magnitude).
19. See John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown
Species with Hotspots Legislation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1157 (2001).
20. Jonathan S. Adams et al., Biodiversity: Our Precious Heritage, in
PRECIOUS HERITAGE: THE STATUS OF BIODIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3,

17 (Bruce A. Stein et al. eds., 2000); see also Michael McCloskey, Changing
Views of What the Wilderness System Is All About, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 369,
374-75 (1999) (summarizing the debate between the original advocates of
wilderness as a spiritual space and the newer conservation biologists).
21. See Andrew C. Revkin, Forget Nature. Even Eden Is Engineered, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2002, at F4.
22.

See CHRISTOPHER STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR

MORAL PLURALISM 3-14 (1987) (critiquing non-anthropocentric ethics).

1178

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1173

natural areas,2 3 endowed with rights, 24 which spiritually
uplifted and sustained us by virtue of their physical beauty.
For better or worse, this discourse has faded into the
background. 25 Environmentalism has become a more rational
movement, dominated by economics and ecology. 26 While
philosophers continue to debate whether non-anthropocentric
ethics are possible, economists and ecologists have progressed
operationally by framing the question as a wholly
anthropocentric one: What do ecosystems do for us?
Environmental economists, as usual, have a firm answer:
Ecosystems are commodities that perform services that can be
quantified and even traded. We revive ecosystems to increase
their output of high-value goods and services. 27 A recent
National Research Council report on the Missouri River
advocates a partial restoration of pre-dam flow patterns in part
because "[ilt is reasonable to believe that improving ecosystem
health, resilience, or biodiversity makes ecosystems more
valuable, but that value cannot be measured directly without
inquiring into the enhanced flow of services from the healthier
28
ecosystem."
One can contest this analysis because revival is equally as
problematic as the earlier, simple idea that we should fence off
humans from nature. 29 Bringing back degraded areas raises a

23. National Park historians agree that the National Park System was
created to preserve geologic wonders, not large ecosystems, although later
See RICHARD WEST
additions had more rational ecological boundaries.
SELLARS,

PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY

2-3

(1997).
24.

See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 32 (1989).
25. See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection:
Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 13 (2000) (lamenting
the loss of wonder and aesthetic enjoyment from environmental discourse).
the environmental
26. Christopher Schroeder has characterized
movement as a struggle for dominance among prophets, priests, and
pragmatists. Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1065 (2003).
27.

See GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY

OF NATURE 1-17 (2002); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 609 (2000).
28. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM:
EXPLORING

THE

PROSPECTS

FOR

RECOVERY

101

(2002),

available at

http://www.nap.edu/books/0309083141/html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003).
29. See Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A
ReportorialFragmentof Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375, 2380-82
(2000) (arguing that this expanded view of nature is the future of
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range of questions from the meta-ethical to the technical. In
my opinion, however, the real issue is not the ethics of revival
but the feasibility. 30 Ecosystem revival will be the biggest
conscious landscape management experiment ever undertaken
because revival tries to reverse the entire history of human
domination of the planet. It may be, as William Rodgers has
suggested, another one of our great environmentalist delusions
that we can successfully pursue two inconsistent objectives, a
working ecosystem and one that works. 3 1 Or, it may represent
the maturation of the environmental movement into a longterm positive force rather than the cult of doom that it often
32
seems to be.
The focus on the revival of degraded systems has the
merits of rationality and pragmatism. Efforts to chart the law
of ecosystem revival can benefit from the substantial (and
continuing) scholarly legacy of Professor Dan Farber applying
John Dewey's powerful, pragmatic methods of analyzing and
remedying real social problems to environmental law and
policy. 33 This Article pays homage to Professor Farber by
environmental law).
30. Some environmentalists argue that nature can only be protected, not
revived, because once it has been degraded, it is no longer a sacred space or a
naturally evolving system.
Compare Eric Katz, The Big Lie: Human
Restoration of Nature, 12 RES. PHIL. & TECH. 231 (1992) (stating that humans
cannot restore damaged nature because all restoration is artificial), reprinted
in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 390 (Andrew Light & Holmes
Rolston III eds., 2003), with Andrew Light, Ecological Restoration and the
Culture of Nature: A PragmaticPerspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN
ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 398 (suggesting an ethical obligation to remedy harms
we humans have done to nature and that benign but artificial solutions may
be good enough). The case against ecosystem revival is so self-defeating and
scientifically irrational that it is easily dismissed. See Flournoy, supra note
12, at 197-201 (summarizing and evaluating the meta-ethical debate); see also
JOHN MARTIN GILROY, JUSTICE & NATURE: KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, & THE LAw 336-84 (2000); ERIC KATZ, NATURE AS
SUBJECT: HUMAN OBLIGATION AND NATURAL COMMUNITY 93-109 (1997).
31. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Myth of the Win-Win: Misdiagnosisin the
Business of Reassembling Nature, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 297, 306 (2000).
32. Environmentalism's gloomy message has been much criticized because
it prevents the maturation of the movement. See, e.g., BJORN LOMBORG, THE
SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE STATE OF THE REAL WORLD
321 (2001).
33. E.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM (1999). For an extended
discussion of Professor Farber's theory of eco-pragmatism, see J.B. Ruhl, Is the
Endangered Species Act Eco-pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885 (2003). Like
most modern students of Dewey, I do not revisit the question of the competing
definitions of truth among pragmatists, see 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 427-35 (1967), but refer to the John Dewey of Human Nature and
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trying to follow his ability to get to the root of important issues
and by always promoting sound incremental solutions
grounded in rationality and feasibility rather than ideology and
scientifically unsupportable assertion.
This Article explores some of the underlying scientific and
legal problems that are raised by the many large and small
ecosystem revival efforts in the United States and throughout
the world. Ecosystem revival is a radical departure from past
environmental paradigms 34 and, however laudatory, is riddled
with unarticulated and inconsistent assumptions which must
be articulated and minimized. The structure of environmental
law and the culture of the agencies that implement it are based
on either the preservation of an undisturbed nature devoid of
humans (but rich in fish, birds, and charismatic fauna) or
pollution control rather than ecosystem management. We look
for quick, technological fixes to mitigate the worst adverse
environmental impacts of activities rather than the sustained
maintenance of functioning ecosystems. In contrast, revival
efforts will require unprecedented, expensive, disciplined,
science-based, and pragmatic approaches. Ecosystem revival
requires legal actors to set measurable objectives and
performance criteria and to undertake long, costly, carefully
structured, and controlled experiments under conditions of
extreme uncertainty rather than to take a simple action to
remedy a simple problem. For example, stopping a dam on a
scenic preserved river generally requires no further action
(except to monitor efforts to revive a rejected project), but
efforts to revive a changed and degraded riverine ecosystem,
either by recommissioning existing dams or removing a dam,
are long-term experiments that carry a high risk of failure. 35
This Article focuses on four problems of revival: (1) the
legal implications of developments in ecology which replace the
Conduct (1922) and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938). Nor do I wish to
debate the philosophical importance of Dewey for environmentalism. See, e.g.,
Larry A. Hickman, Nature as Culture:John Dewey's PragmaticNaturalism,in
ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM 50 (Andrew Light & Eric Katz eds., 1996). For
a brilliant history of the cultural milieu that produced pragmatism, see LOUIS
MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: THE STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 337-75

(2001). See also PRAGMATISM: A READER (Louis Menand ed., 1996).
34. One can, however, find precedents in the New Deal's purchase of
private lands for reforestation.
35.

See THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE ENV'T, supra

note 15, at 113-17 (discussing the need to study the possible adverse effects of
dam removal on a river's sediment system).
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traditional balance-of-nature metaphor with a more complex,
often chaotic conception of ecosystem evolution; (2) the
problems of choosing a revival objective that can be made
operational; (3) the almost complete misfit between resource
conservation law, first generation environmental law, and
ecosystem revival; and (4) the unstable blend of scientific
expertise with local stakeholder participation in revival
experiments which is promoted as "feasible."
II. ECOLOGY: MANY QUESTIONS, FEW ANSWERS
Ecosystem
revival
requires
sustained
ecosystem
management. 36 The idea that we should manage on an
ecosystem scale has been around for over a decade because it
seemed better to promote biodiversity conservation and
environmental quality enhancement rather than focus
narrowly on individual species protection and individual bits of
the landscape such as small wetlands. 37 We have no idea if it
can be done, however, especially on large scales. To pick one of
hundreds of examples, the objective of the Everglades
"restoration" plan is to restore sheet flows to the Everglades
National Park. Many scientists (as well as an American Indian
tribe), however, warn that high flows will compromise the
ecologically important tree islands in the Central Everglades
above the Park 38 and may increase turbidity and the nutrient
39
load in Central Florida Bay.
Modern ecology makes management more complex because
it has substituted moving targets for fixed ones. Modern
ecology is an example of environmentalism's troubled
relationship with science.
Much of environmentalism's
legitimacy is derived from science, but science has not delivered
the results that it once promised. We have tried to convert
36. See JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY
AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 318-39 (2002) (containing a collection of

materials on the meaning of ecosystem management).
37. See Daniel Simberloff, Flagships, Umbrellas, and Keystones: Is Single
Species Management Pass in the Landscape Era?, 83 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION 247 (1998).
38. Keith Kloor, Everglades Restoration Plan Hits Rough Waters, 288
SCIENCE 1166, 1167 (2000).
39. BD. ON ENVTL. STUDIES & TOXICOLOGY & WATER SCI. & TECH. BD.,
FLORIDA BAY RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND THEIR
COMPREHENSIVE EVERGLADES RESTORATION PLAN

RELATION TO THE
9-10, 13-16 (2002),

available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309084911/html/index.html
visited Mar. 9, 2003).

(last
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ecology into a regulatory science that can answer socially
constructed questions such as the long-term cumulative
environmental impacts of small incremental actions. We now
know that managing nature to achieve environmental benefits
is much more complex than initially imagined. Ecology has
made its application even harder by substituting a dynamic for
static view of nature and deconstructing all concepts from
ecosystem to species.
The first concept to go is the idea that nature is sacred
space. Environmentalism's patron saint is John Muir. 40 Saint
John of the Mountains played a major role in making nature
preservation a national political objective. Although modern
environmental historians have attempted to portray Muir as a
proto-ecologist, 4 1 nature preservation was largely undertaken
For
for spiritual, aesthetic, and commercial reasons. 42
example, the railroads played a major role in promoting the
establishment of national parks.43 Nonetheless, Muir's legacy
is that a primary objective of what we now call
environmentalism is to fence large areas of nature from human
exploitation and to limit human enjoyment to uses compatible
with the values of the preserved space. 44 Nature preservation
helped to lay the groundwork for the broader objectives of
ecosystem stability and biodiversity conservation.
In the twentieth century, the emerging discipline of ecology
reinforced the fencing off strategy but added a more explicit
scientific rationale to the spiritual and aesthetic impulses.
Natural areas were reconceptualized from sacred or wondrous
spaces to harmonious, balanced ecosystems. 45 Ecology initially
40. See STEPHEN R. Fox, JOHN MUIR AND His LEGACY: THE AMERICAN
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT (1981).
41. See
MICHAEL P. COHEN, THE PATHLESS WAY: JOHN MUIR AND
AMERICAN WILDERNESS 330-31 (1984).

See supra notes 10, 23.
See ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
(2nd ed. 1987).
44. See Sax, supra note 29, at 2378 ("The first era of environmental
42.
43.

legislation implemented a sort of'enclave' theory of protection.").
45. Russian scientists played a key role in redefining

nature

as

ecosystems whose functioning could be understood through science. The
triumph of Marxist science over ecological approaches to nature conservation
has destroyed much of this legacy. See DOUGLAS R. WEINER, MODELS OF
NATURE:

ECOLOGY,

CONSERVATION,

AND THE CULTURAL

REVOLUTION

IN

(1988).
Frank Golley argues that the environmental
movement seized on the concept of an ecosystem because it provided both a
rational explanation of nature and moral management imperatives, but that
SOVIET RUSSIA
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portrayed ecosystems as progressing through successive stages
to climax and a steady state equilibrium. At the dawn of the
environmental movement, lawyers derived a powerful and
general lesson from ecology: Let nature be. The ur-text was
Aldo Leopold's synthesis of his ecologically based land ethic: "A
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability,
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends
otherwise." 46 Leopold's land ethic has emerged as the leading
land use management alternative to the progressive
conservation movement's ethic of efficient multiple use of
resources and has provided the basis for powerful resource
47
preservation laws.
Leopold and the leading ecologists of his day, such as
Eugene Odum, provided an ecological justification for a land
ethic based on the equilibrium paradigm in ecology, or, as 4it8
was crudely and popularly expressed: the "balance of nature."
Legislators and lawyers enthusiastically embraced this
paradigm because it seemed to be a neutral, universal public
policy principle applicable to the-use and management of all
natural resources.4 9
The contributions of modern
environmental resource management to the legal system-the
National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species
Act, the Wilderness Act of 1964, the Clean Water and Clean Air
Acts, especially the non-degradation provisions and section 404

ecologists concealed problems of theory and method as they "passively
accepted the buzzing activity." FRANK BENJAMIN GOLLEY, A HISTORY OF THE
ECOSYSTEM CONCEPT IN ECOLOGY: MORE THAN THE SUM OF THE PARTS 3-4

(1993).
46. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND
THERE 224-25 (1949).
Leopold is also the Socrates of postmodern
environmental ethics. See, e.g., J. BAIRD CALLICOTT, IN DEFENSE OF THE
LAND ETHIC: ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 223-47 (1989); PAUL W.
TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 285-86
(1988); LAURA WESTRA, AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSAL FOR ETHICS: THE
PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRITY (1994). See generally CURT MEINE, ALDO LEOPOLD:

HIS LIFE AND WORK (1988) (tracing the evolution of Leopold's thinking based
on his conservation experience).
47. There are several good case studies of the search for alternative
paradigms.

See, e.g., DAVID L. FELDMAN, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:

IN SEARCH OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 81-107, 132-56 (1991); RONALD A.
FORESTA, AMAZON CONSERVATION IN THE AGE OF DEVELOPMENT: THE LIMITS
OF PROVIDENCE 6-31 (1991).
48.

EUGENE P. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 25-26 (2nd ed. 1959).

49. See A. Dan Tarlock, The NonequilibriumParadigmin Ecology and the
Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1122
(1994).
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50
of the Clean Water Act-are premised on this paradigm.
In the past two decades the scientific foundations of the
fencing off strategy have eroded. In the still under-appreciated
book, DiscordantHarmonies, Daniel Botkin "deconstructed" the
equilibrium paradigm as a misguided effort to match science to
theological and scientific visions of a perfect universe.5 ' He
argued that the images of nature which have influenced ecology
are erroneously static when in fact resource use problems
require a more accurate view of nature as dynamic, a view
which starts from the premises that human action is one of the
that system
principal forces operating on ecosystems and
52
disturbances are both predictable and random.
The scientific foundations of Leopold's vision have been
53
eroded by more sophisticated theories of ecosystem behavior.
We now study ecosystems at larger scales and have a better
understanding of their dynamic nature. 54 We now realize,
however, that we know less about the long-term functioning of
these systems than we thought we did. 55 We know we must
take a much more comprehensive approach to their care, even
if we are unsure of the scale of management. The objective is
not to preserve their stability to maintain their resilience over
time. As a leading ecologist explains, "some of the most telling
properties of ecological systems emerge from the interactions
between slow-moving and fast-moving processes and between
processes that have large spatial reach and processes that are
relatively localized. Those interactions are not only nonlinear;

50. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1131-1136 (2000); Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671a (2000); National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f.
51. DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6-12 (1990); see also DANIEL BOTKIN, NO MAN'S
GARDEN: THOREAU AND A NEW VISION FOR CIVILIZATION AND NATURE 18-19,

80 (2001).
52. See supra note 51. Stephen Toulmin has traced the roots of the quest

for stability in Western thought from Newton to the present and argues that
the pursuit of universal principles remained the norm "up to John Dewey's
time." Stephen Toulmin, The Idol of Stability, in 20 THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 325, 353 (1999).

53. J. Baird Callicott, Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology
Undermine Leopold's Land Ethic?, 18 ENVTL. ETHICS 353 (1996).
54. See Fred Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn from Large-Scale
Ecology, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 207, 207-21 (2002).

55. Id. at 257-58.
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they generate alternating stable states."56 As a result, the
original concept of resilience as a near equilibrium steady state
has been replaced, and ecologists try to measure resilience "by
the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the
system changes its structure by57 changing the variables and
processes that control behavior."
Some ecologists have drawn a startling conclusion from the
new ecology: The current concept of an ecosystem may no
longer be a meaningful construct. The reason is that the new
ecology undermines the crucial assumptions of the concept.
Ecology has traditionally assumed that an ecosystem has
definable boundaries, that it has spatial homogeneity, that we
may substitute different flora and fauna and still maintain a
sustainable system, that natural selection is relatively
unimportant, that we can identify stability levels at different
scales, and that humans are not part of ecosystems. 58 These
simplistic assumptions are now being recast as more complex,
open-ended criteria that emphasize that stability is a function
of the time scale of observation and the balance between "(a)
rates of change in environmental condition, and (b) rates of
For the foreseeable future, the
change in the biota."59
ecosystem concept will never be totally abandoned. In the
future, however, an ecosystem could be redefined as an
"ecological system" with a range of spatial scales depending on
the time frame adopted, with a wide potential, non-constant
dispersal range for each species, and in which species interact
to maximize biotic potential. Such systems may maximize local
biotic potential at the same time that they begin to exhibit
signs of long-range change.
The first lesson of the new ecology and the deconstructed
ecosystem for revival is that we can never return to a state of
nature; we can only approximate it for an undetermined period
of time. The idea that ecosystems are moving rather than fixed
targets and must be "mapped" at larger scales will subject the
relevant environmental sciences to even greater stress.
56. C.S. Holling et al., In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in
PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL
SYSTEMS 3, 9 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
57. C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive Cycles,
in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL
SYSTEMS, supra note 56, at 25, 28.
58. Robert V. O'Neill, Is It Time to Bury the Ecosystem Concept? (With

Full Military Honors, of Course!), 82 ECOLOGY 3275, 3277-79 (2001).
59. Id. at 3281.
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Scientists must answer questions that require mixed scientific
and policy judgments. In contrast, environmental law and
policy still have a tendency to view degraded ecosystems as
broken machines. We want to know the causal relationship
between the installation of a new part, a management action
(experiment), and improved performance, an ecologically
beneficial outcome. Science can rarely answer the causal
relationship with the expected confidence or comfort level
because it requires unprecedented and costly levels of data
assembly and synthesis and the need to endlessly revisit
previous conclusions and judgments.
The more complex view of ecosystem evolution that
ecologists propound is only one of the many problems that
advances in biology and ecology pose for ecosystem revival.
Along with ecosystems, our understanding of a species has
changed. The future role of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
in ecosystem revival is a case in point. Current revival efforts
are often driven by the ESA as public and private parties often
cooperate to develop a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) or the
equivalent, which may include both preservation and revival
initiatives. 60 HCPs are premised on the assumption that they
will in fact sustain a listed species. 61 At the same time that
scientists were moving toward a more complex theory of the
ecosystem, however, biologists were deconstructing the
Linnaean hierarchy, which forms the basis for scientific and
legal concepts of a species. 62 This thinking has progressed so
far that biologists are considering the abolition of all species
ranks!63 One implication is that biodiversity, not species, will
become the focus of many ecosystem revival efforts. To
conserve biodiversity, it will be necessary to "develop valid
measures of the diversity of lineage taking into account their
actual properties and phylogenic significance. '64 In this new
world, we may have more complex and responsive, but
contestable, biodiversity protection and revival objectives.

60. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and
Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 943 (2003); Ruhl, supra note 33.
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2000).
62. See Brent D. Misler, Getting Rid of Species?, in SPECIES: NEW
INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS 307 (Robert A. Wilson ed., 1999).

63. Id.
64. Id. at 314.
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III. REVIVAL OBJECTIONS: BACKWARDS TO WHAT,
WHERE, WHEN, WHOM?
Ecosystem revival requires measurable science-based
improvement targets, structured system-wide manipulation
experiments, monitoring and evaluation, and the inevitable
revision of the original objectives, targets, and methods in light
of new information. The new ecology teaches that pure
restoration-returning to the system's original condition-will
often be an unrealistic and unachievable goal. Therefore, it
will be necessary to adopt artificial revival targets that
approach but do not totally recreate the preexisting "natural"
condition, and this must all be done under uncomfortably high
levels of scientific uncertainty. The problems start with the
65
first step, the establishment of baselines.
To put the problem in perspective, we should ask why we
look back to a superior past. The preservation of physical and
cultural artifacts provides some useful lessons for ecosystem
revival because its underlying philosophy sheds light on our
veneration of the past and suggests alternative uses of the past
other than an effort to recapture its original condition.
A. JUST WHY Do WE VENERATE

THE PAST?

Ecosystem revival builds from other efforts such as art
restoration and the preservation of historical buildings and
antiquities. Viewed in the light of these precedents, ecosystem
restoration appears as a cultural manifestation of our
veneration of historical authenticity. This uniquely Western
construct reflects the dynamic nature of Western society and
the radical discontinuities that the West has experienced.
Europe and America have undergone many cycles of conquest
that resulted in a sharp break with the past. 66 Therefore,
paradoxically, physical evidence of the past has become an
important cultural resource that is best used by preserving the

65.

The appropriate baseline is at the heart of debates about the efforts to

surround Yellowstone National Park with a protected and "restored" Greater
Yellowstone ecosystem. See PAUL SCHULLERY, SEARCHING FOR YELLOWSTONE

217-47 (1997) (describing the historic spectrum of viewpoints regarding the
management of Yellowstone Park); Duncan T. Patten, Defining the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM:
REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 19, 19-25 (Robert B. Keiter &

Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991) (asserting that Yellowstone's ecosystem has no
definite boundaries and should be managed as a whole).
66. See ALEXANDER STILLE, THE FUTURE OF THE PAST 41-45 (2002).
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past as close to its "original" condition as possible. 67 This
attitude can be seen in the efforts to identify historical
ecosystem baselines for restoration projects. The idea of a
baseline, like a Golden Age or the Garden of the Eden, assumes
that the system was in balance or functioned "naturally" before
European contact. An ecological baseline also rests on the
increasingly discredited notion that aboriginal peoples were
perfect stewards of nature. 68 Alas, there is no temporal
benchmark for revival.
Not all societies venerate tangible remnants of the past.
Non-Western perspectives are useful because ecological
restoration will ultimately be a forward rather than backward
looking process. We will have to synthesize the past, not return
to it, and it is important to understand how different cultures
view the past. Chinese culture, for example, historically did
not value physical authenticity. 69 China was seen as a
continuous civilization and, thus, there was no sharp
distinction between past and present. 70
In addition,
authenticity in art, buildings, and ecosystems reflects an
individualistic rather than collective tradition. Thus, China
does not distinguish between original and forged art but views
accurate copying as a sign of reverence for a past work. 71 The
idea that the past has no value at all can go too far. Personally,
I have no desire to see a world of totally artificial or, worse yet,
virtual ecosystems, 72 but the Chinese view that the past can
67. See id.
68. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
69. STILLE, supra note 67, at 40-41.
70. See id. at 42.
71. See id. at 41-42.
72. When the economist John Krutilla first argued that resources like a
remote scenic area had value because people would pay to preserve it for its
option value, it triggered a rebuttal.
John Krutilla, Conservation
Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1967). In a provocatively titled piece,
What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?, 179 SCIENCE 446, 447, 453 (1973), Martin

Krieger argued that just as people can be educated to prefer wilderness, people
could be educated to accept low-cost artificial environments in place of highcost natural areas. Today, we would undoubtedly argue that we can be
educated to accept fantasy, virtual ecosystems. In response to the question,
"What's wrong with plastic trees?" Krieger answered "very little," because
"more can be done with plastic trees.., to give most people the feeling that
they are experiencing nature." Id. at 453. All environments could become
Disney recreations of nature. This argument is profoundly disturbing to
environmentalists. Laurence H. Tribe responded with a tentative theory,
rooted in pantheism or, more accurately, panpsychism (a theory that accords
all objects in the universe an inner or psychological being), of a social order
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guide re-creation rather than restoration of something lost is a
useful perspective for ecosystem revival.
B. WHAT, IF ANY, ARE THE LESSONS OF THE HISTORIC
PRESERVATION MOVEMENT?

Proponents of historic preservation have struggled to
define their objectives since the movement began in the
nineteenth century and to develop pragmatic solutions to the
re-creation of the past.73
The analogy between historic
preservation and ecosystem revival, though imperfect, provides
useful lessons. Structures, in contrast to ecosystems, are static
rather than dynamic systems. Any change will endure with
proper maintenance. In addition, the objectives of historic
preservation, as opposed to its techniques, need not be
informed by science. This said, the discussion is useful
precedent. When he became head of the French Monument
Service in 1843, Prosper Merimee, best known as the author of
the short story from which Bizet drew his opera Carmen,
distinguished between conservation and re-creation. 74 The first
attempts were to recapture the past form of an extant building
and to construct a replica of something that had ceased to
exist. 75 Later, Eugene Emmanual Violet le Duc, the architect
of what we know today as the walled city of Carcassonne,
uttered his famous definition of restoration as "a completed

based on equal dignity under the law for all aspects of nature. Laurence H.
Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for
EnvironmentalLaw, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1339-40 (1974).
73. This idea originates from the campaign of Violet-le-Duc to rebuild
Carcassonne after the restoration of the French Monarchy in 1815, which
represented a conservative Romantic nostalgia for a lost if mythic past. JOHN
B. WOLF, FRANCE: 1814-1919, THE RISE OF A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
38-41 (1963). Joseph L. Sax, HeritagePreservationas a Public Duty: The Abb6
Grdgoire and the Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1152-65 (1990),
traces the development of a coherent theory to the reports prepared by the
Abb6 Gr6goire for the French National Convention at a time when many
wanted to obliterate all traces of the past, physical or institutional. For
example, in 1793, the Committee on Public Safety decreed that the entire city
of Lyons should be destroyed, following medieval precedents, because, "Lyons
made war on Liberty." WILLIAM DOYLE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 254-55 (1989). Gr~goire proposed a general theory of
preserving historical monuments because they are reminders that a great
civilization is a tolerant and educated one. See Sax, supra, at 1155.
74. WILLIAM J. MURTAGH, KEEPING TIME: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
PRESERVATION IN AMERICA 16 (1997).

75.

Id.
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76
state which may never have existed at any particular time."
Critics are still debating the merits of le Duc's "restoration" of
Carcassonne.7 7 It is the most complete view of the form of a
medieval city, although it certainly represents an idealized
view as opposed to the grim reality of what must have actually
existed.
Historic preservation suggests that in many, if not most,
cases it will not be feasible to restore an ecosystem. We will
create something artificial but something that, we hope, will
deliver more services than the degraded ecosystem. Current
revival experiments finesse this problem by not setting any
permanent system-wide objectives, but usually focus on the
survival of an indicator (usually threatened or endangered)
species. 78 Process is substituted for substance, and the result is
often long delay, increased conflict and partial solutions. For
example, a National Research Council Committee, studying the
decade-long efforts to mitigate the downstream adverse
environmental impacts of Glen Canyon dam on the Colorado
River through a flow regime closer to the pre-dam
hydrograph, 79 noted that no agency had set any long-term flow
objectives related to a vision of the canyon ecosystem and
proposed an approach to doing so:
While many aspects of the Grand Canyon are in fact natural or at
least not subject to management or direct human perturbation, the

76. Id.
77. Id. at 17-21.
78. For example, the fresh-saline water balance has been deteriorating in
the Sacramento-San Jaoquin Delta of California for decades, and a massive
process has been launched to try to balance ecosystem protection and the
continued diversion of large amounts of water from the system for use in the
Central Valley and southern California. A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A COURSEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 697-702

(2002).

These efforts focused on the narrow objective of sustaining an

endangered fish, the Delta Smelt. The fish has survived by a thin margin and
agricultural water users are now agitating to remove the species from the ESA
protected list. Mike Taugher, Delta Smelt's Health Called into Question,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, CA), Oct. 19, 2002, available at 2002

WL 100622157. The Delta ecosystem remains at risk, but the focus on an
indicator species rather than more comprehensive revival objectives hinders
the ability of regulators and stakeholders to focus on the real issue.
79. As a result of the identification of adverse environmental impacts, the
Bureau of Reclamation released a spring beach building flow in 1996, but the
experiment did not achieve its objective. Associated Press, Federal Agency
Has New Plan for Flushing Grand Canyon, LAS VEGAS SUN, available at
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2002/sep/24/092410199.html
(Sept. 24, 2002). Scientists did learn that releases could move sediment out of
the tributaries into the canyon and are now proposing a January flood. Id.
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river itself and the riparian corridor inevitably are a reflection of
human action because of the existence of Glen Canyon Dam.... The
GCES [Glen Canyon Environmental Studies] has shown that
operation of the dam can be modified in various ways to restore a
greater degree of naturalness to the river and riparian environments
through maintenance or restoration of physical characteristics of the
environment such as beaches or biotic resources such as endangered
species.... [Olne obvious basis for future management of Glen
Canyon Dam might be characterized as simulated naturalness, which
could be defined as the use of operational flexibility to restore and
maintain environmental conditions in the national park that
resemble as nearly as possible the original condition of the river.
Many aspects of the river corridor in Grand Canyon National Park
cannot feasibly resemble the original river corridor.., however, there
are many ways in which the environmental conditions along the river
can be restored to a more natural state. These possibilities, some of
which are in place or under construction, include adaptation of a more
natural hydrologic regime, the introduction of controlled floods,
restoration of seasonally warm water in the river, and maintenance of
habitat and physical features such as beaches through manipulation
of water and sediment. The adoption of simulated naturalness would
give a unifying theme and purpose to operational changes
with these
80
objectives, and would provide a blueprint for the future.

C. AN EXAMPLE OF SIMULATED NATURALNESS
Australia's management of the Murray-Darling Basin,
which is plagued with environmental problems from saline land
to degraded aquatic ecosystems, is one of the world's most
ambitious ecosystem revival experiments. It is an example of
an effort by ecologists to establish a "normative" river. 81
Australia's management also illustrates how the revival
standard must modify harmful resource use decisions, and thus
limit existing entitlements, throughout this system. In 1992,
Australia's federal government and the basin states agreed to
the Murray-Darling Initiative to conserve the river's
ecosystem. 82 The Initiative led to the adoption of the federalstate Murray-Basin Agreement and the creation of a joint

80.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE

GRAND CANYON 47-48 (1996), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/
0309054486/html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003). I wrote this paragraph as a
member of the National Research Council Committee to review the Glen
Canyon Environmental Studies.
81. Jack A. Stanford et al., A General Protocolfor Restoration of Regulated
Rivers, 12 REG. RIVERS: RES. & MGMT. 391, 404 (1996).
82. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1998-99, at 7
(1999),
available at
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/naturalresources/polices
_strategies/projectscreens/the cap.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
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federal-state commission overseen by a federal-state
ministerial council.8 3 Unlike an interstate compact within the
United States or an international treaty, the Agreement
imposes much more detailed land use and water management
duties on the parties and is constantly amended. It both
allocates the flow among the basin states and vests the
Commission with the power to control releases from specified
upstream storage facilities.8 4 The Murray-Darling Commission
now runs the river, with supervision by the ministerial council
85
and a stakeholder advisory board.
The Commission's adoption of an artificial base flow regime
and its imposition of that regime on existing users throughout
the basin set an important precedent for other legal systems.
The Commission has initiated a process to set environmental or
base flows for ecosystem restoration based on the impacts of
different flows on the riverine environment.8 6 On developed
river basins, the problem with establishing new flow 'or
hydrograph regimes is vested rights, whether real or merely
claimed. Both the federal and state governments recognized
the need to limit water withdrawals, to establish base flows,
and to stabilize and restore productive agricultural areas,
especially those degraded by salinization.8 7 In 1996, the
Commission announced the "CAP" which is the "cornerstone of
a number of policies designed to manage water resources for
scarcity: water trading, environmental flows and the security of
property rights."8 8 The CAP imposes yearly diversion limits on
89
the four basin states and the Australian Capital Territory.
New South Wales agriculture accounts for many of the stresses
on the basin, and the Commission imposed a state cap based on

83. Murray-Darling Basin Agreement (1992), available at http://www.
(last visited
mdbc.gov.au/about/governance/_pdf word/MDBAgreement.pdf
Jan. 19, 2003).

84. Id., pt. X.
85. Id., pts. III, IV.
86. Id., pts. V, VI.
87.
88.

Id.
MURRAY-DARLING

BASIN COMM'N,

supra note 82,

at 24.

The

ministerial council has commissioned a five year review of the CAP to "identify
any impediments and constraints to its full operation."

REVIEW OF THE

OPERATION OF THE CAP: OVERVIEW REPORT OF THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN

COMMISSION 21 (2000), available at http://www.mdbc.gov.au/naturalresources/
policies-strategies/projectscreens/pdf/FINALReport-Nov00.pdf (last visited
Jan. 19, 2003).
89. MRRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, supra note 82.
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1993-94 withdrawal levels. 90 The caps will vary year to year
according to the supply.9 1 They are administered by each state
and will require aggressive management as agricultural water
diversions are increasing in both New South Wales and
92
Queensland.
Australia is prone to prolonged periods of severe drought
that alternate with wet years. 93 Diversions are increasing
upstream in Queensland and in many New South Wales inland
agricultural districts. 94 In 1996-97 three major sub-basins in
New South Wales exceeded the CAP. 95 Adherence to the CAP
will require many innovative management strategies such as
conjunctive use of ground and surface water, an abandonment
of the "use it or lose it" administration of water licenses, and
the implementation of an accounting system to balance water
use over time. 96 Still, the Commission predicted that the CAP
would be met in all states except New South Wales. 97 Only one
basin, the Lahlan, clearly exceeded the CAP in 1997-98, its first
years of implementation, but usage in other major basins is
approaching the CAP and may exceed it, especially if
development is allowed to increase. 98 The ability of the CAP to
restore the Murray-Darling will not be known for years. The
initial experience, however, suggests that plans which try
initially to maintain the status quo and then to promote
gradual and modest rollbacks in existing uses can be fair,
90. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, MURRAY-DARLING BASIN CAP ON
DIVERSIONS: WATER YEAR 1997/98 STRIKING THE BALANCE (1998), available at

http://www.mdbc.gov.au/naturalresources/policies-strategies/projectscreens/pd
f/Striking-theBalanceReport 97 98.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
91. Id.
92. See MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, WATER AUDIT MONITORING
REPORT 1996/97, REPORT OF THE MURRAY-DARLING COMMISSION ON THE
FINAL YEAR OF THE INTERIM CAP IN THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN 11-13, 17-19
(1998),
available at
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/naturalresources/policies_

strategies/projectscreens/pdf/WaterAuditMonitoringReport_97-98.pdf (last
visited Jan. 19, 2003).
93.

See generally id.

94. Id. at 11-13, 17-19.
95. Id. at 10.
96. MURRAY DARLING BASIN COMM'N, supra note 90, at 10.
97. Id.
98. Water diversions in the Murrumbidgee Valley are approaching the
upper confidence levels of the CAP, and irrigation is projected to increase.
MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, REVIEW OF CAP IMPLEMENTATION 1997/98
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDIT GROUP (1998), available at

http://www.mdbc.gov.au/naturalresources/policies-strategies/projectscreens/pd
fIAGReport9798.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
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In major river
efficient, and environmentally beneficial.
systems there is almost always wasteful agricultural water use
and use in excess of legal entitlements. The CAP thus gives
river managers some flexibility to experiment without the
undue dislocation of legitimate user expectations.
The ultimate test of revival is whether it drives subsequent
resource choices, including the reduction of existing
entitlements. There are various ways to reduce existing
claimed entitlements, and the CAP illustrates a flexible device
for doing this. One example of this is the Pilot Interstate
Trading Program (Pilot) in the Mallee Region of South
Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales along the lower
Murray. Water prices and agricultural crops are similar in the
three states.99 Under the Pilot, individual diverters with high
security water rights may sell water across state lines,
provided that the water licensing authorities in each state
agree to the transfer. 10 0 One of the major unresolved issues in
water marketing is the integration of markets with
environmental protection. The Pilot does this by establishing
exchange values (the amount of water that may be transferred)
among states. 0 1 Trades by upstream diverters from New
South Wales to Victoria, and from Victoria to South Australia,
have a 1.0 exchange rate, which means that 100% of the
entitlement can be transferred.1 02 On the other hand, transfers
from South Australia, which is downstream, to the upstream
states of Victoria and New South Wales have an exchange rate
of 0.9 so that only 90% of the entitlement can be
transferred to
10 3
prevent further salt concentrations in the river.
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
Revival efforts raise legal and institutional problems
because neither the concept of biodiversity conservation nor of
99. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, THE PILOT INTERSTATE WATER
TRADING PROJECT, available at http://www.mdbc.gov.au/naturalresources/
policies-strategies/projectscreens/pilot.watertrade.htm (last modified June 18,
2002).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. For a recent study of the basin which documents the emergence of

water trading to reallocate water, see DARLA HATTON MACDONALD AND MIKE
YOUNG, A CASE STUDY OF THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN: FINAL REPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL WATER MANAGEMENT, available at www.clw.csiro.au/

publications/consultancy/2001/MDB-IWMI.pdf (last visited March 8, 2003).
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ecosystem revival is well integrated into our natural resource
use and environmental laws. Moreover, the institutional
cultures of the resource management and environmental
protection agencies do not support long-term, risky
management.
There are two legal paradigms for the
ecosystem. The dominant paradigm, which is still very much
alive, is that ecosystems are commodity treasure chests to be
exploited for human use. 10 4 Our resource use laws still reflect
this nineteenth century premise. 105 Laws are designed to set
minimum standards for the conversion of public resources into
private entitlements within minimal restrictions
on
exploitation.
In the twentieth century we modified this paradigm by
adding three central ideas to commodity production. First, in
the early twentieth century we decided that some natural areas
should not be developed and instead should be set aside, for
parks or wilderness areas. 10 6 The progressive conservation
movement contributed the twin ideas that some lands should
be withdrawn from development and that mindless exploitation
should be regulated by the government to promote more
efficient resource use. 0 7 We still work with the public lands
management categories left by these legacies: National Forests,
Wilderness Areas, National Parks, and Bureau of Land
Management Lands. Second, in the 1960s the environmental
movement contributed the powerful but limited ideas that
environmental impacts should be assessed before undertaking
an activity, less environmentally destructive alternatives
should be considered, 10 8 and agencies should engage in more
comprehensive planning. 10 9
Third, environmental impact
104. See supra note 72.
105. See supra note 50.
106. See RUNTE, supra note 43.
107. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (1959).

108.

Impact assessment is mandated by the National Environmental Policy

Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2000). NEPA has been construed by the

Supreme Court to impose procedural, but not substantive, duties on agencies.
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-78 (1989). This
decision has led to an extensive debate on the effectiveness of information

assembly and disclosure as an instrument of environmental protection. See,
e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government's Environmental Perfomance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
906-32 (2002).
109. See GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW at chs. 6-7 (1991).
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assessment led to the idea that the most serious adverse
environmental impacts should be mitigated to the extent that
mitigation is technically and economically feasible. I 0
These ideas advanced environmental protection from a
marginal to an equal resource policy objective. The continuing
legacy of the nineteenth century tradition of public land
disposition is, however, that rational mitigated exploitation is
the primary management objective rather than biodiversity
conservation and ecosystem improvement.
For example,
federal land managers still retain great discretion to strike the
final balance among the full range of possible uses, including
revival. II Generally, new environmental objectives have
simply been superimposed over existing exploitation objectives.
The controls on discretion remain primarily political rather
than judicial. As a result, it is virtually impossible to convince
a court to reverse a management decision which trades
biodiversity conservation or revival for some other permissible
objective after due consideration. Likewise, it is very difficult
to contest a decision that opts for limited mitigation over
comprehensive ecosystem revival.1 12
Judicial review is
possible, but courts are likely to intervene only when federal
land management agencies have delegated authority to local
resource users in a way that creates a substantial risk that
federal
management
duties,
including
biodiversity
conservation, will be compromised, 13 or when there is a clear
110. The contrast between this objective and the broader objective of
maintaining functioning ecosystems through management and revival is
captured in the observation of an environmental regulator commenting on a
Rutgers University study of the effects of urban sprawl on New Jersey's
climate. "It's one thing for the state to say you have to control this amount of
polluted runoff.... It's another to say you have to maintain this forest cover or
this result will occur far away. That's not the traditional bailiwick of
environmental regulation. We'll have to evolve ourselves to get to that point."
Kirk Johnson, Mostly Sprawling and Warmer: Scientists Look at How Land

Use Affects New Jersey's Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, at A28.
111. The formal basis for deference to public land management decisions
are the Supreme Court opinions in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001), Christensen v. HarrisCounty, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965). The Court's Chevron doctrine permits a court to

refuse to defer to some agency interpretations its authority but deference
remains the norm.

112. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
113. E.g., Nat'l Park & Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp 2d. 7, 1516 (D.D.C. 1999); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848
(E.D. Cal. 1985).
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14
failure to implement a statutory mandate.
The net result is that environmental law is long on process
and short on substance. This structural flaw makes ecosystem
revival especially difficult because the ability to revive requires
both the legal authority for substantive long-term management
objectives and an agency culture of long-term experimentation.
Under existing statutes and agency cultures, it has proved very
difficult to get agencies to focus on the long term because of the
high degree of uncertainty about the future. For example,
courts are becoming more aggressive in policing impact
statements that have truncated discussions of cumulative
impacts, 115 but a fundamental reorientation of NEPA is
6
required to expand the time horizon of agencies. 1
The growing use of Adaptive Management (AM) illustrates
the institutional problems inherent in revival. AM arose in the
1970s as a remedy to the problem that "fixed review of an
independently designed policy" was inconsistent with the
experience of resource managers worldwide who made
decisions under constantly changing conditions. 117 The need for
rigorous but flexible procedures to make decisions under
conditions of extreme uncertainty has a long intellectual
pedigree. Howard Raiffa's pioneering work in the 1960s on
8 was
decision analysis, which led to his famous decision trees, 18
one of the major influences on the development of AM.'" 9 AM
compliments the precautionary principle, which is a tool to
overcome uncertainty, because it corrects both biases toward
inaction in the face of uncertainty and immediate fixes
unconnected to long term monitoring and assessment.
AM is almost always used in revival efforts, and the
problems with its use start with the establishment of
objectives. Any effort to recreate past conditions requires

114. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Singleton, 47 F.Supp 2d. 1182 (D. Or.
1998).
115. E.g., Texas Comm. on Natural Res. v. Army Dep't, 197 F. Supp 2d. 586
(N.D. Tx. 2002). See Laura Hartt, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's
Ass'n v. NMFS: A Case Study on Successes and Failures in Challenging
Logging Activities with Adverse Cumulative Impacts on Fish and Wildlife, 32
ENVTL. L. 671, 671 (2002).
116. See Karkkainen, supra note 108, at 970-72.
117. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 1 (C.S.
Holling ed. 1978).
118.

HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 10 (1968).

119. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra
note 117, at 119.
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baselines and performance targets. These are not strictly
scientific questions because they require normative judgments
about the value of the past and the extent to which we wish to
try to re-create it. The information necessary to establish the
past may not exist or may present a misleading picture.
Nonetheless, these decisions must be informed by science. The
correction process over the long term, rather than the quality of
data at any given point in the process, is the best guarantee of
the integrity of AM. It is a continuous process of acquiring and
evaluating new scientific information and adapting it to the
experiment.
AM's complexity and rigor make it both politically and
legally controversial and a fundamental challenge to the
culture of agencies. AM is controversial because it often
increases the risk that existing stakeholders might lose their
historic entitlements to land development, access to the
consumptive or non-consumptive use of water, or commodity
production. AM's potential elimination of historic entitlements
often raises substantial takings issues under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. 120 While
AM cannot eliminate all risk, the hope is that scientific
information may be able to contain the risk and convince
stakeholders that increased risks can be managed.
For
example, aquatic restoration does not always require water to
be available in the same quantities each year. 12 1 If the
resilience of the system were better understood, then
stakeholders might be more willing to participate in restoration
schemes because the risk of cutbacks in a single dry year might
be minimal.
AM's primary cultural challenge is that agencies must live
with management choices and uncertain outcomes over a long
period rather than going from quick fix to quick fix. This
problem is complicated by the fact that AM has been adopted as
a quick fix rather than as a fundamental new resource
stewardship option to shift the focus from the mitigation of
120. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49
Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
121. This is the case with the Colorado delta in Mexico, an ecosystem
which has been severely compromised by upstream diversions in both Mexico

and the United States.

A relatively small amount of water appears to be

necessary to sustain the ecosystem's critical functions.

For a comprehensive

survey of restoration options, see Robert Jerome Glennon & Peter W. Culp,
The Last Green Lagoon: How and Why the Bush Administration Should Save
the Colorado River Delta, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903 (2002).
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adverse environmental impacts to sustained ecosystem
revival.' 22 Until the ESA emerged as a major barrier to a wide
variety of private and public activities in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, there was comparatively little interest in AM both
within and without government.
This changed when the Babbitt Department of Interior
promoted AM to induce stakeholder participation in large-scale,
multi-species HCPs, as a way to counter efforts to roll back the
ESA. 123 The process held out the hope to the regulated
community that subsequent data might show the need for less
rigorous protection standards, and that unforeseen problems
could be solved by future but unspecified low-cost corrective
Like all tactical policy decisions, however, the
actions.
adoption of AM as a strategy to save the ESA came with a cost.
AM has come to stand for any action that had an experimental
component and some monitoring. In fact, AM is not muddling
1 24
It
through or applied common sense, as many critics charge.
not
yet
been
accepted
rigorous
scientific
process
which
has
is a
as the foundation of all ecosystem revival. The initial use of
AM squandered much of its initial theoretical rigor and
coherence and made it vulnerable to successful legal
challenges.
Challenges to AM are often embedded in challenges to
HCP or similar conservation plans which use AM in part to
defer important regulatory choices that threaten to undermine
the effectiveness of the plan. Courts have held that such plans
are inconsistent with the mandates of the ESA, and have, in
the process, distinguished between bona fide and faux AM. The
most successful challenge to an ineffective plan is Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 125 but the lesson of the
case is unclear. In brief, the populations of evolutionary
122. Marc J. Ebbin, Is the Southern California Approach to Conservation
Succeeding?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695 (1997).
123. For an insider's perspective, see Joseph L. Sax, Using PropertyRights
to Attack EnvironmentalProtection, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 715 (2002).
124. See John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The Missouri Rive and
Adaptive Management, 80 NEB. L. REV. 816, 849 (2001). These observations
are based on the author's service on various National Research
Council/National Academy of Sciences committees which recommended the
adoption of adaptive management experiments. For a recent statement of the
need to realize that adaptive management is a science-driven process that
seeks to involve relevant stakeholders in a long term management regime see
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING

THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 107-10 (2002).

125.

Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp 2d. 1139 (D. Or. 1998).
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significant units of coastal coho salmon have been declining for
a variety of anthropocentric and natural causes. 12 6 The
anthropocentric causes include timber harvest practices,
livestock grazing, and water diversions. 127
The decision
whether to list the coho as a threatened species under the ESA
was a political football throughout the 1990s because protection
and restoration require intensive management of public and
private land and water. 128 There is no quick technological fix,
and the reserve strategy applied to terrestrial fauna is not
applicable. In 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) withdrew an earlier proposal to list the coho and
decided not to list the coho as threatened because the Oregon
Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative, which supplemented the
Northwest Forest Management Plan adopted in 1994 to save
129
the spotted owl, would reverse the population decline.
California units were, however, listed because the state
apparently made a calculated political decision not to formulate
a similar initiative. 130 Scientific opinion within NMFS was
divided on the effectiveness of the initiative and on the need to
list the species.131
A magistrate judge invalidated the decision not to list the
species because NMFS applied the wrong ESA standard. 132 A
species must be listed if it is likely to become extinct in the
foreseeable future, but the NMFS evaluated only the effect of
the Initiative on population declines over two years. 133 The
primary flaw in NMFS's approach was to base its decision not
on science but on faith in future actions taken by the legislative
and executive branches of Oregon. "NMFS... was unwilling to
make the hard choice required by the ESA." 134 Oregon's
initiative relied in part on watershed councils where landowner
participation was "largely voluntary," and NMFS had rejected
California's action plan, in part, because the state had not
funded a paper watershed initiative and landowner

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

1145-46.
1146.
1146-49.
1149-50.
1150, 1159.
1148.

132. Id. at 1150.
133.
134.

Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1152.
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participation was voluntary. 135 The court concluded that
reliance on the state's initiative was arbitrary and capricious
because it relied on unimplemented, largely voluntary future
actions. 36 The court found "telling" the agency's failure to
explain why Oregon's initiative did not pose the same risks as
California's. 137 "However laudable Oregon's efforts to employ
new management techniques to try to restore the Oregon Coast
ESU, such future voluntary conservation effort cannot be a
138
substitute for listing."
The difference between AM and a flawed conservation plan
relying on it is illustrated by National Wildlife Federation v.
Babbitt.139 This case involved an ambitious regional HCP for a
53,000 acre, relatively undeveloped flood plain near
Sacramento. 140 Development of this area obligated a multijurisdictional agency, the Natomas Basin Conservancy, to
assemble several connected blocks of land funded by
development fees. 14 1 In exchange for the plan, the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) issued a biological opinion that granted
umbrella incidental take permits to several local governments
and water districts. 142 HCPs immunize development against a
section 9 taking suit in the short term in exchange for the
143
implementation of a multi-species plan over a long period.
To do this, the plan had to make crucial assumptions. The
Natomas Basin Plan (Plan) assumed that only about a third of
the basin would in fact be developed and that future threats to
the species's continued survival as development took place
around the reserve system could be minimized through
44
aggressive AM. 1
The National Wildlife Federation challenged the theory
that the incidental take permits could precede a complete plan
based on extensive scientific research and thus challenged the
Plan's reliance on AM to correct any errors in the initial

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1156-59.
Id. at 1159.
Id.
Id.

139.

128 F. Supp 2d. 1274 (E.D. Cal. 2000).

140. Id. at 1276-77.

141.
142.

Id. at 1280.
Id.

143.

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).

144. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 128 F. Supp 2d. at 1281-82.
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scientific assumptions. 145 Specifically, it argued that the Plan
must estimate the number of species and the number of
permits that would be issued. 146 The court brushed this aside
by holding that the HCP met the minimum statutory
requirements under Chevron. 47 Plaintiffs also challenged the
FWS's projection that only 17,500 acres of the basin would be
developed and the consequent conclusion that a combination of
reserve agricultural land would be sufficient to protect the
covered species. 148 These were found to be within the FWS's
expert discretion because they concerned "the uncertainties
inherent in the market-based mitigation mechanism employed
by an HCP" and an inevitable part of the complicated decision
149
making that led to the HCP.
Instead of invalidating the key risk assumptions behind
the Plan and AM, the court focused on the weakest deals that
placed limits on the future use of AM. 150 These included the
lack of regional responsibility and the Department of Interior's
(DOI) inability to secure adequate funding. 15 1 First, the court
invalidated as arbitrary the FWS's conclusion that the amount
of the mitigation fee would be sufficient to acquire the
necessary habitat because it was unsupported by substantial
evidence. 152 Administrative purists may object to combining an
adjudicative and rule-making standard but the court, in effect,
enforced the Supreme Court's Nollan-Dolan standard. The
Nollan-Dolan standard requires that land exactions be based
on a reasonable showing of need and that the exaction be
proportionate to the need generated by the land use. 153 By
failing to demonstrate compliance with the standard, the DOI
may have miscalculated the necessary level of exaction.
Likewise, the court held that the DOI could not issue a permit
after the city refused to assume financial liability for the
154
plan.
145.

Id. at 1290.

146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1291.
Id.
Id. at 1296.

149.

Id. at 1298.

150. See John Kostyack, NWF v. Babbitt: Victory for Smart Growth and
Imperiled Wildlife, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10712 (2001).
151. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 128 F. Supp 2d. at 1299.

152.

Id. at 1299-1300.

153. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-96 (1994); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
154. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 128 F. Supp 2d. at 1298-99.
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The FWS's willingness to proceed without an adequate
funding mechanism also extended to its willingness to approve
a regional HCP premised on the participation of only one public
actor, the city of Sacramento, when, in fact, success ultimately
depended on multi-jurisdictional cooperation. This was fatal
for several reasons, including the failure to discuss the effect on
the reserve and corridor design if only the city participated in
the Plan. "In short, the Service's failure to consider whether
the survival of the species will be put at risk by the City's
permit, if the regional mitigation approach of the HCP is not
55
available, is arbitrary and capricious."'
V. STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION
Changed public values that lead to alternative landscape
visions, hopefully supported by science, will ultimately
determine the decision to revive a specific ecosystem. The
current thinking is that in the absence of effective federal and
state leadership, local or regional collaborative public-private
stakeholder processes will be necessary, or at least the best
156
available alternative, to broker many of the revival "deals."
Stakeholder-driven processes, so the argument goes, can
navigate through the otherwise impassable maze of conflicting
entitlement claims and divergent interests. 57 The hope, and it
is just that, is that consensus will replace conflict, excessive
legal rigidity, litigation, and gridlock with widely acceptable
solutions.1 58 The rationale for stakeholder or expanded public
participation, however, exposes a fundamental tension in
ecosystem revival between expertise and lay participation. The
question is whether extensive lay participation will be
consistent with revival experiments which are fundamentally
155. Id. at 1299-30.
156. For a cautiously optimistic assessment of these efforts, see Robert L.
Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution
Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered
Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45 (2002).

157.

For a good case study that supports this thesis see Ruth Langridge,

Changing Legal Regimes and the Allocation of Water Between Two California
Rivers, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 327 (2002) (arguing that agency and

stakeholder participation in decision-making
restoration).

processes promotes

river

158. For a penetrating examination of the weakness of the current mania
for consensus processes, see DOUGLAS S. KENNY, ARGUING ABOUT
CONSENSUS: EXAMINING THE CASE AGAINST WESTERN WATERSHED
INITIATIVES AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE GROUPS ACTIVE IN NATURAL
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (2000).
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informed by science.
The root of the tension is the modern disenchantment with
the New Deal administrative state. The current focus on
stakeholder governance is the latest stage of efforts to use
public participation as a counterweight to the narrow focus of
expert decision making and the landscape degradation that the
mature state produced. 159 Disenchantment began in the 1960s
with efforts to halt sterile urban renewal projects that unfairly
dislocated poor and minority residents. Public participation
raised the voices of marginalized interests and gained strength
from powerful theoretical critiques of the administrative state
and the idea that sustained it, the public interest. 160 The
prestige of science, supported by its role in World War II and
the Cold War, diminished. In attacking the consequences of the
administrative state, environmental NGOs in effect used
postmodern thought to discredit science's claimed monopoly on
truth by asserting that science and technology, the foundations
of the post-New Deal state, are the social products of the
current politics.' 6 1 Postmodern thinking, following William
James, views all forms of "discourse" as social or political
constructs and does not rank the different forms. 162 Thus,
ethical postulates or emotional "connections" to a subject are as
legitimate as more rational, scientific bases for decision
making. This argument is generally coupled with empirical
criticisms of the use of science to cabin unacceptably high levels
63
of public health and ecosystem impairment.
159. See THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE:
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 5 (2002).
160. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
161. A. Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 135,
150 (2002).
162. See Bird, supra note 7.
163. For example, a recent study of the impact of nuclear technology on the
Western landscape from nuclear weapons testing to the proposed high-level
waste repository in Yucca Mountain links the systems of ecology of Eugene
Odum (the proponent of the influential ecological theory that natural systems
tended to homeostasis if left undisturbed) and others to the destructive hubris
of science:

Like the models used to determine water pathways to Yucca
Mountain today, the models used by Odum and others in ecosystems
ecology promised control.
The managerial ethos conceptually

transforms nature into an integrated circuit, hardwired for work and
productivity, a cybernetic system-a predictable, self-regulating
system .... It is an ethos of control.
VALERIE L. KULETZ, THE TAINTED DESERT: ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
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Criticism of science does not always appear in this form
but is never far from the surface. Stakeholder involvement or
lay control generally takes the indirect form of insistence on
greater transparency in administrative decision making and
increased and more meaningful public participation in the
process of the decision.
These are laudable, democratic
objectives, but transparency and public participation are often
used to make two inconsistent claims that can complicate
revival actions. At times, they are invoked to allow NGOs and
others to "unmask" the scientific assumptions behind a policy
and advocate a result not fully supported by conventional
science. This argument can take several forms. Some use it to
argue for a shift from science to ethics as a basis for legitimate
decisions, 164 while others, such as Cass Sunstein, use it to
promote greater agency accountability in the use of science to
165
make mixed scientific-ethical decisions.
Others offer a different justification for transparency that
finesses these problems and asserts that if the lay public is
better informed about the scientific nature of the problem,
interested parties will understand the science inherent in a
decision. 166 The hope here is that the legitimacy of a sciencebased decision will be better accepted and will serve to bridge
divergent interests.
Specifically, this understanding will
foreclose inconsistent entitlement claims and other objections
to the experiment. For example, this is certainly the case in
the argument that public and "stakeholder" involvement is
necessary for the successful practice of AM to restore degraded
RUIN IN THE AMERICAN WEST 278-79 (1998).
164. E.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A
Normative Critique of ComparativeRisk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 565

(1992).
165. Professor Sunstein has expanded the participatory model of
administrative regulation to encourage agencies to be more candid about the
uncertainties inherent in modern science-based regulation and to provide
better justification and disclosure of the winners and losers of the regulation.

Because conventional science is not structured to answer the questions before
the agency, he argues that the EPA needs to do a better job of explaining the
extent of the adverse effects that it has identified and the reasons that the
regulation is suited to the information the agency has developed. This can be
done by the preparation of a benefits analysis, which describes in quantitative
and qualitative terms the savings from the regulation and outlines at least
two alternative regulatory scenarios. The ultimate result could be a common
law of health protection based on the candid disclosure of the inferences and
assumptions behind a science-based decision. Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean
Air Act Unconstitutional?,98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 379-80 (1999).
166. See Davidson & Geu, supra note 124, at 888-89.
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ecosystems.
At some point, the tension must be resolved because it is
unlikely to be completely eliminated.
The tension can
complicate revival experiments in several ways. For example,
revival is used as a pretext for further degradation, and resort
to scientific "evidence" will be necessary to check the faux
revival. 167 In other cases, revival objectives may exceed the
limits of scientific justification. Sometimes, science may reveal
that the geographic scope of the revival experiment is too small.
The costly efforts to achieve higher salmon runs in the
Columbia River may illustrate both of these points. 68 The best
solution is to couple a presumption favoring science-based
decision making with public accountability as a checking
mechanism. A decision should be classified as science-based if
there is a credible, but not necessarily a peer-reviewed,
consensus within the scientific community. This analysis
rejects the false dichotomy between good and bad or junk
science as well as the narrow definition of science adopted by
the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.169 because it is unproductive and non-scientific and
increasingly inhibits the use of science in regulatory decision
making. Decision makers must be allowed to propose decisions
that represent prudent extensions of existing knowledge.
The requirement of a credible scientific foundation rather
than a higher but unattainable standard is sufficient to
promote the accountability necessary to integrate science into
democratic decision making. The burden of disputing a revival
strategy should fall on those who disagree with the science. It
is legitimate to proceed in the face of uncertainty if there must
167. The United States Forest Service has the power to launch stewardship
contracting projects which can include resource extraction! Many projects that
simply exchange timber harvesting for some ecosystem improvements such as
increased protection of stream corridors have been criticized, inter alia, as
disguised timber sales with no scientific basis.
AMERICAN LANDS,
STEWARDSHIP

CONTRACTING

PILOT

PROJECTS

UNDERMINE

ECOLOGICAL

RESTORATION, available at http://americanlands.org/forestweb/pilot-projects.

htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
168. The hard reality of efforts to save various Columbia-Snake River
salmon runs is that we have spent several billion dollars in what may be a
futile effort. A group advocating the removal of four Lower Snake River dams
estimates that more than 3.5 billion dollars has been spent to save runs that
may become extinct by 2016. Green Scissors, Too Dam Much Snake, at
http://www.greenscissors.org/water/snakeriver/htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
169. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (explaining that the primary test of admissibility

is peer reviewed literature).
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be a reasonable threshold of scientific evidence before it can be
invoked and a continuous feedback mechanism that enables the
original decision to be reviewed and adjusted in light of new
Therefore, contesting a decision requires a
knowledge.
reasoned, alternative analysis grounded in science. For the
regulatory community, the burden will not be different from
the one that most courts now apply. A decision can be
impeached only by showing the lack of a credible scientific
Scientists must be prepared to answer the
foundation.
questions that legislatures and the public want answered.
CONCLUSION
Ecosystem revival poses a profound challenge to our
existing regulatory regime and the culture of the institutions
charged with implementing it. So far we have avoided the
problem of structural change by making revival an open entry
industry. Private entities and all levels of government can
undertake revival experiments. There is little coordination
among the different legal experiments, in part, because the
authority for public revival is either implied or project-specific.
In addition, revival is often carried out by resource agencies
that are frantically searching for new missions and funding as
contemporary politics moves farther beyond their origins in the
Goals, performance criteria, and
pre-environmental era.
feedback or adaptive mechanisms are often nonexistent. We
have been living off the intellectual capital of the
environmental movement for over three decades, although
understandings of the objectives and complexities of
environmental protection have rapidly evolved.
Eventually, the nation's environmental laws will have to be
revised to reflect the experience of the past thirty years. We
need new statutory foundations for ecosystem revival. Agency
mandates must be updated to allow more extensive revival
assessments. Revival must be defined as a rigorous experiment
that sets ecosystem performance targets with the capacity to
monitor and assess progress and to modify the experiment.
Because revival will never be an exclusively federal (or state)
responsibility, agency efforts must be better integrated with
stakeholder participation. The process that led to the current
Florida Everglades restoration is a possible model. The key
state and federal agencies and the NGOs reached an agreement
on a restoration plan and got the federal government and the
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state of Florida to fund it.170 Federal and state legislation could
offer grants to regional public-private coalitions that want to
develop an effective revival strategy that complies with federal
environmental and other mandates in a way that would permit
a lower but economically rational level of commodity
production. Once a plan is approved, a funding package that
would address needs such as "victim" compensation would be
available to establish performance targets and implement them
through an adaptive process.

170. See Mary Doyle & Donald E. Jodrey, Everglades Restoration:Forging
New Law in Allocating Water for the Environment, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 255 (2002).

